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The Dispute Settlement Understanding of
the WTO Agreement: An Inadequate
Mechanism for the Resolution of
International Trade Disputes
Sean P. Feeney*
The 1994 signing of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agree-
ment marked the initiation of the most far-reaching and comprehensive
international agreement on trade in the history of the modem world. 2 The
creation of an actual trade organization was a marked improvement over
the WTO's predecessor, the 1944 GATT, which never formed an organi-
zation per se.3 Among the many improvements to the GATT, the WTO
Agreement substantially changed the mechanism for dispute settlement
whenever conflict arose between member states.4 This change, codified as
the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), was initially hailed as a
great improvement over the GATT dispute settlement provisions.5
* J.D. candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law (May. 2002); BA. Duke University
(May, 1999). The author would like to thank Professor Roger Alford for his advice with this
topic. The author would also like to thank his family for all their support.
1. The WTO was created at the 1994 "Uruguay Round" meetings of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), where GAIT signatories reached an agreement in princi-
pal. The \VTO officially organized on April 15. 1994 through the Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization. John H. Jackson et al. Legal Problems of International
Economic Relations, 289-90 (1995). The WTO governs and administers international trade. It
currently consists of nearly 150 countries, with thirty more nations hoping to join. The organiza-
tional structure of the WTO consists of four principal groups: the Ministerial Conference. the
General Council, the Secretariat, and the Director General. The principal goals of the V/TO in-
clude developing a lasting, multilateral trading regime, reducing tariff rates and other roadblocks
to international trade, eliminating discrimination in international trade, and expanding trade in
goods and services. See Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of Seat-
tle, 17 Ariz. J. Int'l. & Comp. L. 257, 266-68 (2000).
2. See id. The purpose behind the WTO Agreement was to form a concrete organization
that its predecessor, the GATT, did not. ld. In this manner, the WTO %vas a formalization of the
GAT, but with many important changes. ld.
3. The GATr was simply a contract agreement entered into by many countries, in which
its signatories were referred to as "contracting parties." See T"efenbrun, supra note 1. at 267-
268. The WTO, proposed by a Canadian trade minister in 1990. is an organization and calls its
signatories "members." Id. See note 12 infra, for a general discussion of the GATrs framework.
4. Tiefenbrun, supra note 1, at 267-68.
5. See Carolyn B. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther. The WTO Dispute Settlement Implemen-
tation Procedures: A System in Need of Reform, 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 709 (2000). ThIe U.S.
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Unfortunately, the DSU has not been the comprehensive dispute set-
tlement mechanism its framers had hoped to create.6 Myriad problems ex-
ist with the DSU in its current state, and the remedies to these problems
will not come easily. After explaining the history of the GATT, this paper
will discuss the current aspects and procedures of the DSU, examine the
problems with these procedures, and suggest how the dispute settlement
system under the WTO can operate in a more effective and efficient
manner.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GA'IT
In 1947, the GATT went into effect.7 At that time, the International
Trade Organization ("ITO") had already been created under the "Bretton
Woods" Agreements. 8 The GATT was intended to be nothing more than a
temporary international trade agreement during the interim between the crea-
tion and ultimate ratification of the ITO.9 The United States never ratified the
ITO, however, because of "perceived threats to national sovereignty and the
danger of too much ITO intervention in markets."' 0 Hence, the GATT, origi-
nally intended to be nothing more than a stepping stone to a more compre-
hensive international trade agreement, served as the default authority on inter-
national trade for more than fifty years."
The framework of the GATT 2 incorporated many of the major theories
Congress praised the achievements, saying that the most important improvement of the DSU over
the GATT's dispute settlement system was the increased leverage that one member state could
have over an offending member state in remedying a violation. Id. This leverage came from the
withdrawal of trade benefits from that offending member state if the offending member state did
not comply with the DSU panel's finding. Id.
6. See WTO's Defective Dispute Settlement Process, The Hindu, July 6, 2000.
7. After the failed actualization of the ITO in Havana, Cuba, twenty-three nations ratified
the GATT in Geneva Switzerland on October 30, 1947. The GAIT was the primary international,
multilateral trade regulation agreement and the most progressive international trade agreement up
to that time. See Tiefenbrun, supra note 1, at 261.
8. See Michael Laidhold, Private Party Access to the WTO: Do Recent Developments in
International Trade Dispute Resolution Really Give Private Organizations a Voice in the WTO?
12 Transnat'l L. 427, 429 (1999).
9. See id. at 430. Specifically, the GAIT was designed to serve as a temporary agreement
while the rest of the ITO members waited for the U.S. to ratify the ITO agreement.
10. Id. (quoting Michael R. Czinkita, Executive Insights: The World Trade Organization-
Perspectives and Prospects, 3 J. Int'l Mktg. 85 (1995)).
1I. See Laidhold, supra note 8, at 430.
12. The GATT is essentially a three-tiered approach toward trade liberalization. First, the
GATT calls for the reduction and ultimate elimination of both quantitative and non-tariff trade re-
strictions that member countries imposed upon goods from other member countries at their bor-
ders. See Brett Grosko, Just When is it That a Unilateral Trade Ban Satisfies the GATT?: The
2
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on international trade that existed during the Bretton Woods Agreements in
1947. 3 Up until that time, the traditional theory was that states trying to max-
imize their own powers and interests would dictate international trade.' 4
While the GATr marked a major broadening of this theory, it lacked any en-
forcement mechanism to counteract states complying with GAFF provisions
only when it was in their individual best interests to do so.1s
This lack of enforcement created a major problem in the area of dispute
resolution.' 6 From 1955 until the passage of the WTO Agreement in 1994, the
GATT system on dispute resolution grew from what started as an ad hoc sys-
tem to one that appeared more "'legalistic' and professional."' t7 However, for
all the improvements in dispute resolution under the GATT during that thirty-
nine year period, it still retained one overriding fundamental failure: GA'TT
dispute resolution was non-binding to the parties involved.' 8 The need for a
more enforceable method for dispute resolution was instrumental in the sign-
ing of the WTO Agreement. 19
WTO Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case, 5 Envt'l. L. 817 (1999). Second. the GAT calls for
"most-favored nation" treatment by all members towards other members. Id. "Most-favored na-
tion" treatment, also called "normal trade relations," means that GAIT members would treat
products imported from different member states equally. In other words. Member A could not
impose a 5% tariff on Member B's exports if it was only imposing a 3% tariff on the exports of
Member C. Finally, the GAIT called for "national treatment," meaning countries were obligated
to treat equally domestic and imported products. Id. Similar in scope to the "most-favored na-
tion" treatment, "national treatment" meant that Member A could tax Member B's manufactur-
ers of certain products at 5% only if Member A was taxing domestic manufacturers of those
same products at 5%. The original 1947 agreement was supplemented and changed by several
subsequent rounds of negotiations between its member states, the most recent being the Uruguay
Round, which ultimately led to the signing of the W'TO agreement in Marrakesh. Morocco. Id.;
see also Jackson, supra note 1, at 289-90.
13. See Laidhold, supra note 8, at 430. The Bretton Woods Agreements were made at an
international financial conference held in 1944 at Bretton Woods. NH. See Beth A. Simmons,
Why Comply With the Public International Law of Money?, 25 Yale J. Int'l L 323. n. 60 (2000).
The agreements included the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). See Michael D.
Sandier, Section Recommendation and Report, 30 Int'l L 441, 444 (1996). For more information
on the IMF, see www.imforg.
14. Laidhold, supra note 8. at 430.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 340. The DSU states that dispute settlement is a central
feature of the WTO system. Id.
3
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THE WTO DSU PROCEDURES AND PENALTIES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
1. Deciding the Dispute
Under the DSU, the WTO Agreement's dispute settlement process begins
with a "request for consultations" by the party who is alleging a violation. 0
If the offending party does not respond to this request, or does not otherwise
resolve the conflict, the complaining party then requests the Dispute Settle-
ment Body draw up a panel.2' Unless the parties agree otherwise, this panel
possesses the power to interpret any agreements between the parties to the
dispute.22 The parties then choose panelists from a WTO approved list of po-
tential panelists that are well-qualified and informed on international issues.23
To prevent any problems with nationalism, citizens of the parties' countries
are barred from being panelists.24
After meeting twice and receiving written briefs from the disputing par-
ties before each meeting, the panel deliberates in private and makes its re-
port.25 This report, most importantly, includes the panel's legal findings and
recommended remedies. 26 It must be issued within six months of the second
meeting.27
Within sixty days after the release of the panel's final report, the Dispute
Settlement Body must accept the remedies unless they agree to reject them or
one of the parties decides to appeal.28 In the event of an appeal to the Appel-
late Body, the Appellate Body's final report binds the parties unless the Dis-
pute Settlement Body concludes there is a consensus to reject it-an over-
whelmingly rare event.29
20. See Amelia Porges, The New Dispute Settlement: From the GATT to the WTO, 1075
P.L.I./Corp. 1095, 1103 (1998).
21. See id
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. This problem with nationalism is a change from the old GATT system, where
the panels included nationals from the countries that were party to the dispute. See infra, note 40.
25. See Porges, supra note 20, at 1095, 1103. The panel releases a preliminary report at
some point during this six month period, After this preliminary report, the parties are again af-
forded the opportunity to be heard before the panel releases their final report. See id.
26. See id. at 1103.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 1104.
29. See id. at 1105.
4
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2. Enforcement of the Panel Provisions
Following the adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report, the offend-
ing party has thirty days to inform the Dispute Settlement Body how it plans
to implement the mandated remedies.30 The drafters of the \VTO Agreement
acknowledged that immediate implementation of such remedies would not al-
ways be practical, or even possible. Accordingly, the DSU calls for such im-
plementation within a "reasonable period of time."' 3' What is reasonable,
however, is not specifically spelled out in the DSU Agreement.3'-
3. Penalties for Non-Implementation within a Reasonable Time Period
If a party does not implement the panel's recommendations within the
reasonable time period (read: the offending country does not cease the offend-
ing trade practice), the complaining party is entitled to seek some sort of ret-
ribution.33 This redress comes as either 1) compensation for the value of the
damages caused by the offending party,3 or 2) suspension of concessions pre-
viously given by the complaining party to the offending party. 5 This retribu-
tion is the key and decisive difference between dispute settlement under the
GATT and dispute settlement under the WTO. Under GATT Article XXIMl,
a complaining, prevailing party technically had the option to suspend conces-
30. See Porges, supra note 20, at 1105.
31. Id.
32. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 344. The reasonable period of time may be 1) devised by
the complaining party if approved by the Dispute Settlement Body. 2) agreed upon by the parties
involved in the dispute, or 3) by arbitration. It is generally thought that this period should not ex-
ceed fifteen months. See id.
33. See id.
34. It is important to note that while compensation must equal the monetary value of dam-
ages caused by the offending party, such compensation is not monetary. but rather comes in the
form of lower tariff rates and other concessions. See N'VTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.
Art. 21. Further, such compensation is voluntary and must be agreed to by the prevailing party
under Article 12.
35. See id.
36. Mhile it is the key and decisive difference, such suspension of concessions, also re-
ferred to as the implementation of countermeasures, has only occurred in five cases brought
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. See Joost Pauwelyn. Enforcement and Countennea-
sures in the WTO: Rules are Rules-Toward a More Collective Approach. 94 Am. J. Int'l. L 335.
335 (2000).
5
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sions owed to the offending party.37 However, this option could only be exer-
cised if GATT members agreed that such a suspension of concessions was the
right course of action.38 Under the "consensus rule," as it was called, a single
panel vote could block the adoption of the panel report that would suspend
concessions to the offending party.39 The inherent problem with this rule was
that, due to the non-binding nature of GATT dispute settlement provisions,
the offending party's vote was required for consensus. 0 As a practical matter,
such a requirement made the 'suspension of concessions' provision for GATT
violating parties virtually useless.
41
PROBLEMS WITH THE DSU
1. Lack of Clarity in Explaining Complaints during the Initial Stages of
Dispute Settlement
Even during the initial stage of the DSU mechanism for resolving dis-
putes, the consultations stage, there are problems with the degree of clarity
required in requesting consultations. 42 Articles 4, 6 and 7 of the DSU require
that the parties requesting panels, should the consultations stage fail to yield a
compromise, fully explain the basis of their complaints.43 Once claims go to a
panel, parties cannot revise them at a later time. 4 Such a requirement only
makes sense in ensuring the fairness of the panel hearings. To draw a paral-
lel, United States Federal Courts prohibit the altering or amending of plead-
ings once entered unless such an amendment would not unduly prejudice the
37. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 344.
38. See id. at 342.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 344. In fact, during the entire GAIT regime this authority was never actually
employed, and was only granted once. In 1955, the Netherlands was authorized to suspend con-
cessions to the United States because the U.S. had placed certain quotas on Dutch agricultural
products. The Netherlands never followed through with the suspension. See id.
42. See Gary N. Horlick & Glenn R. Butterton, A Problem of Process in WTO Jurispru-
dence: Identifying Disputed Issues in Panels and Consultations, 31 L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 573,
579 (2000). Under Articles 4, 6 and 7 of the DSU, parties requesting panels must fully list the
basis for their complaint; parties who do not will receive harsh treatment. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.; see also WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R 9a 142-146 (Sept. 9, 1997) (hold-
ing that once claims had been presented in a formal panel request, they could not be altered or
amended in later written correspondence). It is important to note, however, that stare decisis does
not currently play a role in international law or in WTO findings. See Raj Bhala, The Myth
About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law, 14 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 845 (1999).
6
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other party.45
Unfortunately, the current DSU fails to state how clear complaints must
be during the consultations stage." This is a substantial shortcoming of the
entire DSU process. It is fundamentally unfair if one party enters into an at-
tempt to avoid the formal dispute settlement process without being fully
informed.4 7
2. General Panel Refusal of Amicus Briefs by Interested Parties.
Until a recent decision by the Appellate Body, the prevailing notion was
that DSU panels were prohibited under Article 13 from even accepting ami-
cus briefs from interested third parties.48 In that decision, United States-Im-
port Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products ("U.S. Shrimp"),
the original DSU panel held that Article 13 allowed only the parties to the
dispute to submit briefs in support of their positions.49 The Appellate Body
reversed the panel, but only to the extent that future panels had the discretion
to accept, consider, or reject amicus party briefs as opposed to being prohib-
ited from exercising this discretion.:
The "U.S. Shrimp" decision does not require panels to accept briefs, as
many commentators initially believed. The decision merely grants discretion
to the panels in deciding whether or not to accept amicus briefs.5' The Appel-
45. See FRCP 15(a). Presumably, a WTO member's withholding the basis for that member
party's claim in an attempt to force an unfair settlement would unduly prejudice the other mem-
ber to the dispute.
46. See Horlick, supra note 42, at 579.
47. See id. It is even more unfair that parties not be required to reveal their entire con-
plaints during the consultations stage, when one considers that the DSU requires parties go
through this stage in an attempt to avoid the next stage of the dispute settlement provisions, the
panel establishment. If the idea behind such a requirement is that parties that are forced to try to
work out their differences may do just that, it is only fair to the parties involved that each has all
the facts before entering into a binding compromise. See Jackson. supra note I. at 341.
48. See Andrew W. Shoyer & Eric M. Solovy, The Process and Procedure of Litigating at
the World Trade Organization: A Review of the Mork of the Appellate Body 31 L & Pol'y Int'l.
Bus. 677, 685 (2000) (discussing the recent WTO Appellate Body decision in United States-Im-
port Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products).
49. See id. at 685-86. The Panel in that case concluded that parties themselves could incor-
porate amicus brief positions into their own arguments, but such incorporation entailed that the
same parties were responsible for anything those amicus briefs contained. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
7
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late Body relied on the following language of DSU Article 11 in determining
that the panels could consider outside information in deciding disputes:
[A] panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an ob-
jective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the
relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in mak-
ing the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered
agreements.
52
Essentially, the Appellate Body claimed that Article 11 of the DSU authorizes
DSU panels to consider all "relevant" information. 53 Unfortunately, less clear
is how far the panels may go in arriving at this "relevant" information. 54
Hence, there is the possibility that a panel could be unfairly swayed, fully at
its discretion, based upon the non-confining nature of the Appellate Body's
interpretation of Article 11.
3. Lack of Transparency in Dispute Settlement Body Proceedings.
A major problem with the DSU is the lack of transparency in dispute
settlement proceedings. Dispute Settlement Body panels are conducted in pri-
vate, so no other parties with an indirect interest in any given dispute can ob-
serve, read, or in general know what steps led to the panel report.
Many people see trade policy, and especially the World Trade Organization, as opaque
and unresponsive to the public...[Mhey are not entirely wrong. The trading system must
... become more open to civil society. There is no reason the interested public should be
excluded from observing dispute settlement proceedings. 55
Former United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky underscores
a central shortcoming of the Dispute Settlement Understanding proceedings:
the fact that the proceedings are conducted in private and the documents per-
taining to the same are kept under seal. 56 The reasoning behind such secrecy
in the proceedings is founded in the underlying principles of mediation and
compromise that defined dispute settlement under the GAIT: that a settlement
not involving a "court" per se should be kept quiet as an incentive for
resolving the dispute before trial. 57 However, the DSU under the WTO oper-
52. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, art 1I. See also Shoyer, supra note 48, at 687.
53. See id
54. See id.
55. Former Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Remarks Prepared for Delivery: ISAC Ple-
nary Session (May 6, 1998) at http:www.ustr.gov/speeches/index.html.
56. See John A. Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO-Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO
Live Up to the Moniker "World Trade Court?" 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 739, 750 (2000).
57. See id.
8
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ates more like litigation, at least once it gets beyond the consultations stage.5s
Because DSU proceedings are more like a judgment than a negotiated com-
promise, these proceedings should be made open to the public. Other NVTO
members and their citizens deserve to know what specifically has been judged
to be fair and unfair, as well as the circumstances that initially gave rise to
the dispute.59 The United States is a major proponent of the movement de-
manding greater DSU transparency to ensure more fair disclosure of the prac-
tices of other member nations. 6w
4. The Non-Binding Nature of the VTO and the Question of Precedent
and Stare Decisis.
The DSU panel report India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Products affirmed that the doctrine of stare decisis does not ap-
ply to Dispute Settlement Body panel decisions.6' Regardless of the similarity
between a present dispute and a prior dispute heard by a panel, the current
DSU panel can hold and recommend exactly the opposite of hat was held in
the past.62 Because panels are not bound by decisions of previous panels re-
lating to or substantively identical to issues at hand, the deterrent effect is
greatly mitigated upon the VTO member against whom a complaint has been
lodged.
There has been some indication that panels do actually follow prior
panel reports, at least to some degree, in making their recommendations.9
Furthermore, winning parties (and interested third parties) tend to hail their
victories as "precedent. '" 64 Generally, parties will only acknowledge or at-
58. See id.
59. See ri. at 751.
60. See David A. Gantz, Failed Efforts to Initiate the "Millennium Round" in Seattle: Les.
sons for Future Global Trade Negotiations, 17 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L 349. 357 (2000).
61. See India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Products (1998). at
<www.wto.org/english/traptopse/dispu.e/79Rpdf> 55.
62. See id. This panel report is the first authority on whether binding precedent exists in
international trade law. However, other information hinted that this was indeed the case. Under
international public law, there is a clear statute stating that precedent does not bind future cases.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26. 1945. 59 Stat. 1055.
63. See Bahala, supra note 44, at 871.
64. See hi. Of course, those same parties do not pay attention to the potential law-making
effect their disputes and the disputes of other parties may have on the future of dispute settle-
ment under the DSU.
9
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tempt to acknowledge a DSU panel or Appellate Body holding as binding
when that decision is favorable to those parties' own self-interests. 65
Related to this lack of precedent in Dispute Settlement Body panel and
Appellate Body reports is the question of enforcement. The WTO, despite the
countermeasures and compensation provisions set out in the DSU, has no
means by which to actually force a non-compliant member country into com-
plying with panel reports. 66 As is discussed below, this essentially means that
a country does not have to comply with a WTO DSU decision if, all things
considered, they would be worse off for complying than not complying and
accepting the sanctions. 67
5. Weaker Developing Country Still Means Weaker Bargaining Power in
the Institution of Countermeasures.
Recall the earlier discussion concerning the suspension of concessions
(also known as countermeasures) as a possible remedy to a trade violation
under the WTO and GATT provisions. 6 There is a wide variation of levels of
sophistication across the membership of the WTO countries. Such disparity in
the countries naturally leads to a disparity in bargaining power.
An unfortunate consequence of this disparity in bargaining power is that
countermeasures will only truly be successful when a stronger member initi-
ates them against a weaker member.69 When a stronger member initiates the
suspension of concessions against a weaker member, such suspension could
likely have a dire effect on that weaker member.70 In contrast, a weaker mem-
ber initiating countermeasures against a stronger member is likely to be met
65. See id. Perhaps the traditional theory on international trade discussed at the Bretton-
Woods Agreements (supra notes 13-14) in 1947 is not quite as obsolete as international trade ex-
perts would like to believe.
66. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Issues in Modern International Environmental Law, 10 Colo. J.
Int'l. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 251, 254 (1999).
67. See, e.g., discussion, infra note 73.
68. See discussion, supra notes 33-35.
69. Pauwelyn, supra note 36, at 338. Furthermore, even where a developing member is
granted concessions, the process is generally quite delayed. The entire DSU process, at its
slowest, can take nearly three years to be implemented, and as such, a developing country may
have taken all the right steps to gain relief, yet still suffer irreparable harm. See WTO's Defective
Dispute Settlement Process, supra note 6. This slow moving system can be especially ominous
for developing countries when one takes into account that the DSU countermeasure provisions
are not retroactive to harm that has occurred before the panel issues its recommendations. ld.
70. See Pauwelyn, supra note 36, at 338. The economic and political pressure placed on
the ruling bodies of such countries will likely result in compliance with the panel report because
of the hardships that will result in the face of the non-compliance countermeasures. See id.
10
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with non-compliance. 7' The stronger member will not be terribly affected by
the countermeasures imposed upon it by the weaker member, and will likely
proceed with its offending practices.7- There are also "retaliation" concerns
associated with any weaker member taking action against a stronger member,
as there are many areas of international relations not governed by the VTO."
6. Decreasing Efficacy of the Consultations Stage.
Evidence suggests that the consultations stage of the DSU is waning in
its efficacy to settle disputes before they reach the panel stage.7' Very few
cases since 1998 have been settled during the consultations stage."1 These re-
sults directly contrast with what the framers of the DSU desired when they
drafted the procedures for dispute resolution between WTO members. By re-
quiring that parties enter into consultations before a panel is formed to medi-
ate a dispute, the WTO drafters had hoped that many disputes would be re-
solved in the spirit of cooperation between the parties. 76 Unfortunately, it
appears that parties would rather wait for the panel processes-exactly the
opposite of what the WTO framers had in mind. 7
71. See id.
72. See it
73. ld. Pauwelyn's article uses the following scenario to illustrate these concerns: Estonia
wants to invoke countermeasures against the United States in response to unfair trade practices,
but is also highly dependent upon the United States for development aid. Estonia is thus put in
the dilemma of whether to simply accept and deal with the unfair trade practices the U.S. em-
ploys against it, or to institute countermeasures and risk retaliation in the form of less or even no
development aid. Such aid is not under the jurisdiction of the \WTO. and the U.S. could freely
suspend such aid without fear of countermeasures. Id.
74. See Olin L. Wethington, Conumzentar on the Consutation Mechanism Under the 11TO
Dispute Settlement Understanding During its First Five Years. 31 L & Pol'y. Int'l Bus. 583. 588
(2000).
75. See id. For example, in 1998. only five disputes under the DSU were resolved during
the consultations stage. In 1999, only one case was settled before a panel issued any report. Even
in that case, European Communities-Measure Affecting Butter Products. WTIDS72I7 (Nov. 18.
1999), the parties, New Zealand and the European Community, resolved the matter by agreement
after a panel had been formed. Id.
76. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 289-90.
77. See Wethington, supra note 74, at 588.
11
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SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVED DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE WTO
FRAMEWORK
1. Emphasize Full Disclosure of the Basis of Dispute during the Consul-
tations Stage.
Recall that one problem with the DSU is its failure to clarify how much
parties must disclose during the consultations stage.78 The only fair remedy to
this problem requires that complaining parties fully disclose the basis of their
disputes at the initial consultations stage.79
Requiring parties to disclose the entire basis of their dispute will im-
prove the overall DSU dispute settlement process.80 Such a requirement will
bring about two substantial changes in the current dispute settlement process.
First, the emphasis on full disclosure during the initial stages of DSU dispute
settlement will help to ensure due process to all parties involved, which will
only heighten the fairness of the proceedings." Second, such disclosure will
improve the efficiency of the system as a whole. With full disclosure of the
complaining party's dispute, more disputes will be resolved and disposed of
in a timely manner before ever reaching the panel stage. 2 Thorough informa-
tion logically produces a quicker result.
2. Amend the DSU to Mandate the Acceptance of Amicus Briefs during
Panel Considerations.
The WTO should provide more of an opportunity for interested parties to
be heard in disputes through amicus briefs. Fairness dictates that parties with
an indirect interest in a dispute be given the chance to offer a position in sup-
port of their respective decisions. In many cases, the panel's decision will, at
the very least, affect those parties, who could potentially bear the burden of
the panel's decision.8 3 Allowing the submission of amicus briefs in addition to
78. See Horlick, supra note 42, at 579; See also discussion, supra note 44.
79. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 341. It appears necessary to require full disclosure when
one looks at the number of cases to date that have been settled during the consultations stage. As
of Spring, 2000, forty-one of the seventy-eight complaints that have been disposed under the
DSU have been resolved at the consultations stage. See Christopher Parlin, Operation of Consul-
tations, Deterrence and Mediation, 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 565, 569 (2000).
80. See Horlick, supra note 42, at 579-81.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Terence P. Stewart & Amy Ann Karpel, Review of the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing: Operation of Panels, 31 L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 593, 607 (2000). The United States has
offered a similar proposal to allow interested parties to attend the oral arguments made before the
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the briefs submitted by the parties will ensure that interested parties have the
opportunity to protect themselves."'
3. Provide Greater Transparency in DSU Proceedings.
Currently, the DSU excludes individuals or organizations who are not
parties or third parties to a dispute before the Dispute Settlement Body from
both making or even attending the oral arguments.1s The EU, Japan, and other
WTO members support this exclusion for various reasons, a position opposite
that of the United States.86 The problem with this provision is that it excludes
non-governmental organizations, interested parties, and other individuals from
being a part of a decision that will bear directly upon their day-to-day opera-
tions.87 It is inherently unfair to deny an organization or individual the oppor-
tunity to be heard when a decision rendered could have such dire
consequences.8s
Allowing interested parties to attend the oral arguments and participate
in the argument process is key to creating a more comprehensive and funda-
mentally fair dispute settlement process under the WTO. The counter-
argument that such third parties should be excluded from the decision as irrel-
evant to the parties to the dispute pales in comparison to the number of par-
ties possibly affected by a decision, even when they have no part in the dis-
position. The DSU should be amended to grant these interested parties a
voice.
In addition, very strong arguments exist for allowing simple, overall
transparency in DSU panel hearings. The position promulgated by the EU and
Japan, that DSU hearings should continue to remain open only to the parties
involved in the disputes at hand, is incompatible with establishing trust in the
DSU and WTO as a whole8 9 Greater transparency is essential. Simply al-
DSU panels and WTO Appellate Body. See id.
84. See Kevin R. Gray, Internet Symposium: Issues in Modern International Environmental
Law, 10 Colo. J. Int'l. Envtl. L. & Pol'y. 405, 406 (1999). Such assurance is necessary because
there is currently no cause of action for an interested or adversely affected party to demand being
heard if a panel decides not to accept their brief. See itd
85. See Stewart, supra note 83, at 604.
86. See id. at 607; see also Gantz, supra note 60, at 357.
87. See Stewart, supra note 83, at 607.
88. See, e.g., FRCP 24(a).
89. See, e.g., Faryar Shirzad, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Prospects for Reform.
31 L. & Po'y Int'l. Bus. 769, 770-71 (2000).
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lowing these decisions to be open to anyone who is interested will help the
process gain the trust of the people who are subjected to its jurisdiction. For
example, one of the major reasons why environmental protestors thwarted the
WTO "Millennium Round" in Seattle stemmed from their adverse reaction to
a DSU panel report that struck down a U.S. restriction on trading with coun-
tries that did not adequately protect Sea Turtles. 90
4. Greater Encouragement of Regional Treaties as a Method for Resolv-
ing the Problems Created by a Lack of Precedent and Disproportion-
ate Bargaining Power between Stronger and Weaker Members.
There is no simple solution to the major problem caused by lack of pre-
cedent and stare decisis in international trade law. Perhaps the following sug-
gestion could remedy the resulting issue of non-compliance.
The WTO Agreement allows two major exceptions to the principles of
equal treatment for all member nations9' outlined in Article 1.92 The first ex-
90. The decision by the VTO Appellate Body underscored the philosophical conflict be-
tween international trade and environmental concerns. See Jennifer A. Bernazani, The Eagle, the
Turtle, the Shrimp and the WTO: Implications for the Future of Environmental Trade Measures,
15 Conn. J. Int'l L. 207 (2000). In that case, the Appellate Body overturned a United States law
prohibiting trade for certain products with countries that did not have an acceptable standard for
Turtle Excluder Devices ("TED's"). See WTO Dispute Settlement Appellate Body Report,
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R
(Oct. 12, 1998). The Report based its conclusion on the rationale that the law constituted dis-
crimination because a convention between several American countries relaxed the time period for
certification of the TED's, whereas other countries not parties to the convention had no flexibility
on the time period (giving special treatment to certain WTO members without according it to all
members in violation of Article 3). See id. The environmental groups' outrage was predictable
and great, and the resulting protests over the decision were one reason why the Millennium
Round talks, scheduled for Seattle in 1999, were never able to get off the ground. See Sean D.
Murphy, Collapse of Efforts to Launch Millennium Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 94
Am. J. Int'l L. 375, 378 (2000). It is perhaps naive to propose that these problems would not
have occurred had there been a more informed populace about the reasoning behind the decision.
However, it is not implausible to surmise that many who would have protested the decision
would have understood the reasoning behind it had they been informed of the arguments through-
out the panel hearing.
91. These equal treatment principles are normal trade relations and national treatment. See
discussion, supra note 12.
92. See Article I, WTO Agreement. There are other important exceptions to the rules of
normal trade relations and national treatment that are of questionable importance to this discus-
sion but nonetheless deserve mention. Article 20 (specifically subsections (g) and (h)) allows for
disparate treatment of another member nation if done to protect human, animal and plant health
and the conserve natural resources. Article 21 allows for disparate treatment of another member
nation if such treatment protects national security. Further, while the WTO agreement does not
expressly provide for an exception for preferential treatment of developing countries, a permanent
waiver for such treatment was signed by WTO members. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 1115.
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ception, under Article 24, §5, is a Free Trade Agreement. The second excep-
tion, under Article 24, §8, is a customs union.93
A free trade agreement consists of a group of states agreeing to reduce
and ultimately eliminate tariff rates among them on specific goods.9 Under
such an agreement, WTO members can reduce and eliminate such tariffs so
long as they maintain current tariff rates for other WTO members." While
such an arrangement would otherwise violate normal trade relation status, as
WTO members not party to the free trade agreement would pay a higher
tariff rate than WTO members and non-members in the free trade agreement,
such pacts are allowed because of the efficiency they promote in regional
trade.9
Similar to free trade agreements are customs unions.97 Like free trade
agreements, customs unions eliminate tariffs among the member countries.ss
They take the provisions of free trade agreements a step further by unifying
their external tariff rate as to all other nations.99 Such a union is attractive to
WTO members-it creates a stronger negotiating standpoint in that outside
members must now negotiate with a group of countries regarding trade rates
and barriers.100
Since WTO member nations are allowed to establish treaties that relate
only to certain members so long as those treaties do not result in indirect
93. See WTO Agreement, Article 24.
94. See Article 24, §5. See also Andrea Kupfer Schneider. Getting Along: The Evolution of
Dispute Resolution Regimes in International Trade Organizations, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L 697. 739
(1999). While many other free trade organizations exist, the most well-known is the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), entered into by the United States. Mexico and Canada in
1994. For a more detailed discussion and information about NAFTA, see www.mac.doc.gov/naftal
nafta2.htm.
95. See Schneider, supra note 94, at 739. Essentially, a member state in a free trade agree-
ment cannot "cover" its losses in lost tariffs by raising tariff rates with respect to other WVTO
members. See Article 24, §5.
96. See Sheila M. Raftery, Safety Net and Measuring Rod: The North American Free
Trade Agreement Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program, 12 Temp. Int'l & Comp. LI. 159
(1998). Countries benefit from these types of agreements because the resources and specialties of
each nation are more efficiently allocated among the nations party to the agreement. See id.
97. See WTO Agreement Article 24, §8.
98. See id.; see also Schneider, supra note 94, at 739.
99. See id. There are many customs unions in existence, the most well known being the
European Union. For a more detailed description of the EU. see www.europa.eu.in.
100. See Schneider, supra note 94, at 739-40.
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harm to other member nations,' 0' one can assume that greater incentives to
establish more favorable treatment with neighboring or near members will
greatly increase the efficiency of world trade. If parties have more reasons to
cooperate, it logically follows that they will have less reason to engage in
DSU proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Despite the many improvements the WTO's Dispute Settlement Under-
standing features in comparison to the former dispute settlement provisions
under the GATT, myriad problems still exist with the DSU. As this paper has
discussed, the major problems are: 1) the overall clarity of the DSU; 2) the
discretionary refusal of amicus briefs by parties interested to disputes; 3) a
lack of overall transparency in Dispute Settlement Body Proceedings; 4) a
lack of precedent to follow in DSU proceedings; 5) disproportionate bargain-
ing power between stronger and weaker member countries; and 6) an overall
decreasing efficacy of methods designed to avoid formal dispute settlement.
These issues must be addressed before the DSU truly becomes a fair mecha-
nism for resolving disputes between WTO members.
A reform approach calling for greater clarity, accessibility and trans-
parency of DSU proceedings would go a long way towards gaining the trust
of would-be disputants under the WTO provisions. Such disputants, especially
those members raising trade issues before the WTO DSU for the first time,
will undoubtedly feel more comfortable if they know exactly how the system
operates and what they can expect.
Further, the plaguing lack of stare decisis and precedent in international
trade law will be most difficult to combat. How can any one organization,
such as the WTO, pass legislation that makes international trade law dispute
decisions binding when that legislation itself is not binding? In that context,
the best solution to such a problem would call for parties to minimize their
disputes and thus never even have to deal with the uncertainty of whether a
panel decision binds them.
Obviously, such a solution will be very difficult to bring about. How-
ever, if the members of the WTO were to amend their agreement to allow
more regional trade agreements with special incentives for instituting them,
the number of disputes would likely fall. Regional trade agreements promote
international trade efficiency. Such efficiency would reduce costs to all parties
involved. Further incentives to those parties for initiating such agreements
101. Article 24 of the WTO allows trade unions and free trade agreements.
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would also mean reduced costs. In sum, the minimizing of costs could logi-
cally lead to the minimizing of disputes.
The WTO's DSU, while to date the most progressive agreement for set-
tling international trade disputes, is a system in need of major reform. A
more transparent system would gain the trust of the members who are subject
to the agreement. Such trust would lead to the minimization of disputes and
an overall increase in the efficacy of the DSU process.
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